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CONSULTATIONS UNDER THE WTO'S DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT SYSTEM
ROBERT ALILOVIC

I. INTRODUCTION

The creation of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes 1 (DSU) has heralded a new
approach to dispute resolution in international trade law. A majority of
the Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) have welcomed
the advent of a more adjudicative dispute settlement system. The system
is one that incorporates a clear set of rules, set within a limited time
frame, with a panel and appellate structure which not only sets forth
binding decisions but which also, through the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB)2 , oversees the implementation of those decisions. Under the
DSU, Member states that have a grievance against another Member for
perceived unjust trade practices may present their claim to an
adjudicative panel.3 This panel, consisting of impartial, well-qualified
individuals, conducts a formal hearing and presents a binding decision
that is automatically adopted, unless the DSB decides by consensus not
to adopt the report. 4 If a Member to the dispute believes that the panel
erred on an issue of law, it may seek to have the Appellate Body review
the panel's ruling. 5
Despite the incorporation of a binding legal process, the WTO is a
creation of international relations, where dialogue and conciliation have
always played a key, if not vital, role in the resolution of disputes. Prior
to reaching the panel stage, the DSU has set up rules and procedures,
under Article 4, whereby Members must engage in consultations in
1
Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, Annex 2, (1994) 33
I.L.M. at 1226 [hereinafter DSU].
2
Ibid. art. 2.1, 2.4. The DSB is the administrator of the DSU.
3
Ibid. art. 6.
-1 Ibid. art. 11- art. 16.
5
Ibid. art. 17.
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order to attempt to resolve their differences amicably. Although the
parties may request that the organisation provide assistance in the form
of mediation, the negotiations customarily involve the disputants
exclusively. Should these consultations fail to produce a mutually
agreeable settlement, the judicial mechanism of the DSU commences
with the formal panel hearing. Thus, even within the legal-oriented rules
of the DSU, the importance of negotiations between states is apparent.
Unfortunately, many would gloss over the negotiation phase as a
relatively inconsequential prelude to the adjudicative panels, thereby
ignoring the benefit that a mutually agreed upon solution retains over an
imposed decision.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that consultations remain a
vital element of the WTO's dispute settlement process. The study begins
with a brief look at consultations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 6 and the procedural difficulties which were inherent in
its dispute resolution system. In order to discern how the system
currently operates, it is important to understand how conflicts were
resolved where no binding panel system loomed to threaten reprisals
should talks fail.
Next, the paper discusses the DSU rules detailing the procedures
and the scope of consultations, as well as the rights and duties of the
complainant and respondent. Examination of the rules will reveal that
the framers of the DSU never intended that the panels and the Appellate
Body would be the sole mechanisms for dispute resolution within the
WTO. The purpose of the DSU was to achieve the expeditious
resolution of a dispute, agreeable to all parties. To that extent, diverse
fonns of alternative dispute resolution were not only provided for, but
also encouraged as possibly being a more effective means of dispute
settlement.
An examination of the cases which have been brought before the
WTO, both settled and adjudicated, offers general observations
regarding the WTO negotiations. In particular, three issues must be
addressed. The first asks what role consultations play within the WTO
dispute settlement system. The second issue examines why some disputes
are resolved in consultation, while others proceed to the panel level. What
6

General Agreement 011 Tariffe a!!d Trade, 30 October 1947, 61 Stat. A 11, T.I.A.S. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 194 [herinafter GATT].
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factors, situations or political motivations allow some discussions to
proceed smoothly, while other disputes create such an impasse that
belligerents refuse to even attempt negotiations? The final section
contrasts the effectiveness of consultations under the GATT and the WTO
and, in particular, considers how the binding nature of impending panel
decisions influences the parties during the consultation phase.

n. CoNsULTATioNs AND D1sPUTE SETTLEMENT UNDER GATT
Dispute resolution under GATT suffered from a series of
procedural failings. When a dispute arose, the Contracting Parties would
first attempt to negotiate a settlement through bi-lateral consultations. If
these talks were unsuccessful, the GATT Council would select a panel
to hear the dispute, whose decision could be adopted by the Council.7
However, the disputants were not forced to adhere to the panel's
findings. 8 That is to say, any member, including the loser of the decision,
could block the panel's recommendation from being adopted.
Unfortunately, this blocking feature was frequently used by parties
disenchanted with a panel's repori and, by the 1960s, governments
began to challenge the fairness of the GA TT dispute settlement
procedure:
GATT's ... dispute settlement machinery does allow governments to
slow things down, and sometimes to block them entirely. Present
procedures are loose, and depend on co-operation ..... The actual
invocation of that [panel] process can often be delayed or deferred by
asking for other kinds of proceedings first. .... Finally, the panel's
capacity to make complex or difficult legal interpretations has also
traditionally required cooperation of the defendant govemment. 9

7
GATT, supra note 3, art. XXII, art. XXIII. Art. XXIII allowed the matter to be referred to
the Contracting Parties who could make recommendations or give a ruling on the matter to the
contracting parties.
8 William R. Spruance, "The World Trade Organisation and United States' Sovereignty:
The Political and Procedural Realities of the System" (1998) 13 Am. Univ. Int'! Law Rev.
1225 at 1237-1238.
9 Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System a!ld World Trade Diplomacy, 2d ed. (New
Hampshire: Butterw01ih, 1990) at 295.
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A detailed analysis of the GATT' s procedural failings is beyond
the scope of this paper. What is important for this discussion, however,
is that the GATT was intended as a mediatory forum. It was felt by
many, especially the Europeans, that:
The goal of dispute resolution in GATT context should not be to create
clear-cut binding rules ... of law [but rather] to end the dispute ... as
soon as possible. Given the sovereign nature of the disputants, this
goal is best accomplished through careful negotiations and appropriate
compromises. 10

Such compromises, if they can be achieved, are preferable "to
litigation [because] agreed solutions are always the most durable and
also produce the best long-tenn relations between members" 11 As it
turned out, the blocking abilities of the parties meant that negotiations
played an especially important role under the GATT. In many cases, the
only way a resolution could be achieved was through diplomacy.
However, consultations could not solve every crisis, especially
when the disputes became more complex and political. With the 1980s
came a substantial increase in the number of cases being brought before
the GATT. More and more of these involved highly sensitive issues and
more ambitious legal complaints. This in tum led to the increased use of
the parties' veto power to block adverse panel reports. 12
Faced with this dilemma, the drafters of the Uruguay Round 13
realised that major procedural changes were required to enact an
effective dispute settlement system. With regard to consultations, some
limit was needed to prevent negotiations from proceeding indefinitely,
without overly intruding upon the independent nature of such talks. In
10
Lisa Klainman, "Applying GATT Dispute Settlement Procedures to a Trade-in-Services
Agreement", (1990) 11 U PA J Int'!. Bus. L. 657 as found in Michael K. Young, "Dispute
Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers Triumph over Diplomats" (Summer, 1995) 29 No.
2 Int'! Lawyer 389 at 390.
11
Robert E. Hudec, E11/orc!i1g lntemotional Trade Low: Fite EJJo!ution oj' !lte !Vlodem
GATT Legal System. (New Hampshire: Buttersworth, 1993) at 280.
12
Ibid. at 14, 290-1. Examples of blocked panel decisions during 1985-86: US lawsuits
against the EC in EC - Canned Fmit and EC - Citrus, both "blocked by the EC, leading to the
US retaliation in the Ci!nts case in 1985 and to the mobilisation for retaliation in Conned Fruit
case in September averted by a settlement at the end of the year" at 201.
13 The Uruguay Round was a series of economic negotiations completed in 1993. The talks
produced numerous international agreements, including the DSU, which were signed by over
100 countries in 1994. For a detailed overview of the Uruguay Round, see The WTO
Secretariat, Guide to rite Untguoy Round Agreements (The Hague: Kluwer Law, 1999).
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addition, it was necessary to grant more authority to the panels and
eliminate the potential blocking effects that had undermined the Parties'
confidence in the GATT's dispute resolution process. As will be seen,
these changes to the panel stage would have important repercussions on
the consultations phase.

m. nsu RULEs FoR CoNsULTAnoNs
At first glance, the new 'legalistic' provisions of the DSU may
appear to be in marked contrast to the more diplomatic GATT dispute
resolution rules. Indeed, the DSU allows for the automatic establishment
of a panel upon request and the automatic adoption of a panel report.
Whereas any party under GA TT could block the adoption of a panel
report single-handedly, the reverse holds true under the DSU rules. A
panel report is adopted unless the DSB decides by consensus against the
establishment of the report. 14 Equally innovative is the creation of a
standing Appellate Body to review panel decisions on issues of law. 15
Once again, this Body's report is automatically adopted in the same
manner as the panel decisions. If either the panel or the Appellate Body
finds a measure to be inconsistent with the covered agreement, it
recommends steps to bring the measure into conformity. 16 Finally,
failure to comply with a decision within a reasonable period of time may
result in the suspension of concessions. 17
A fmiher difference from the previous GATT dispute rules is the
strict timeline imposed in almost every step of the dispute settlement
system. Panel reports are adopted within sixty days of being circulated
to the Members; Appellate Body reports are adopted within thirty days
of being circulated to the Members. 18 Furthermore, the DSU stresses the
importance of strict and expeditious compliance with these repo1is.
14

DSU, stipra note 1, art. 16.4.
/bid. mi. 17.1.
16
/bid. art. 19 .1
17
/bid. art. 22.l, 22.2.
18
If a case runs its full course to a first ruling, it should not normally take more than about
one year - 15 months if the case is appealed. If the case is considered urgent, the case should
take three months. See online: World Trade Organization
Disputes Menu <http://
www .wto.org/wto/about/disputel .htm>
15
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Within thirty days of the adoption of a report, the Member concerned
informs the DSB of its intentions in respect of the implementation of the
rulings. 19 If the Member is unable to comply, it is given a "reasonable
period of time" to do so, as determined by the procedures established in
Article 21(3). These, and other provisions were designed to regulate and
expedite the WTO's dispute settlement system and to augment DSB
control over the Members through a more adjudicative oriented dispute
settlement system. Yet for all the legalistic control mechanisms inserted
in the DSU by its drafters, it should not be overlooked that these controls
were designed to supplement the diplomatic aspects of the GATT,
which were reinforced in the DSU.
Although the DSU introduced major procedural changes to the
GA TT dispute settlement system, it is only a "comprehensive
elaboration of the rules and procedures governing dispute resolution
under the GATT, not a formal amendment to either Article XXII or
XXIII." 20 Article 3(1) of the DSU provides evidence that the Members
of the WTO wish to continue utilising GA TT' s conciliatory
mechanisms:
Members affim1 their adherence to the principles for the management
of dispute heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of GATT
1947, and the rules and procedures as further elaborated and modified
herein.

Thus, GATT's focus on amicable dispute resolution, rather than on
a formal dispute settlement system, is carried over to the DSU, which
places great emphasis on the pre-panel consultation phase. 21 Irrespective
of the strict legal rules contained in the DSU, this document's primary
purpose is to continue, where possible, the resolution of international
trade disputes through conciliation rather than through quasi-judicial
panel decisions. The fact is that litigation is not the only path to the
termination of disputes, and many would argue that litigation ranks a
poor second to an agreement reached through consultation:
It is an inescapable fact that issues that divide States are best settled by
negotiation and agreement. ... The greater the direct involvement of the

DSU, supra note 1, art. 21.3.
Young, supra note 10 at 397.
21
Palitha T.B. Kohona, "Dispute Resolution under the World Trade Organisation: An
Overview" (1994) 28:2 J. World T. 23 at 33.
19

20
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opposing parties in the process of finding a solution to their
differences, the greater the likelihood of a satisfactory and lasting
outcome. 22

Proof that the drafters of the DSU valued the above reasoning can
be found within Article 3(7):
the aim of the dispute settlement mechanism is to secure a positive
solution to a dispute. A solution mutually acceptable to the patiies to a
dispute and consistent with the covered agreement is to be prefened.

In order to reach such an informal solution, the drafters of the DSU
incorporated numerous diplomatic elements into the rules. To begin
with, disputing paiiies can agree to resolve their dispute through good
offices, conciliation or mediation. 23 This avenue was set up so as to be
very convenient to employ; states may avail themselves of this provision
at any time, even after the panel process has been initiated, 24 and the
mediations may be terminated at any time. 25
Should the Members choose to forgo mediation, they must still
undergo consultations prior to triggering the legal elements (panels) of
the system. Unlike GATT consultations, however, the DSU
incorporates a strict timeline in order to prevent parties from obstructing
the process with unresolvable or purposefully unproductive talks. When
a request for consultations is made pursuant to a covered agreement, a
reply to the request must be made within 10 days after the date of the
request's receipt. 26 Thereafter, the Members enter into consultations in
good faith within 30 days of the date of receipt of the request, with a
view to reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. If a Member does not
adhere to these times, the complainant may proceed directly to request
the establishment of a panel. 27 Should the consultations fail to settle a
22
Elihu Lauterpacht, "Aspects of the Administration of International Justice" 6 ( 1991) as
quoted in William Davey & Amelia Porges, "Performance of the System I: Consultations &
Deterrence: Comments" (Fall, 1998) 32 Int'! Lawyer 695 at 698.
23
DSU, supro note 1, art. 5.1.
24
Kohona, supra note 21 at 34. She notes that this flexibility in mediation demonstrates the
emphasis of "obtaining a result that is mutually acceptable to the parties to the dispute rather
than encouraging them to embark on the more formalised dispute settlement process."
25
DSU, stipra note 1, art. 5 .3.
26
/bid. art. 4.4. All requests for consultations should be in writing, giving reasons,
including identification of the measures at issue and an indication of the legal basis for the
complaint.
27
/bid. art. 4.3.
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dispute within 60 days of the date of the receipt of the request for
consultations, the complainant may request the establishment of a
panel. 28 The Article addressing consultations is rather detailed and even
addresses 'cases of urgency' such as those concerning perishable goods,
where consultations should begin within 10 days of the receipt of the
request. In these situations, a settlement must be reached within 20 days
or the complainant may proceed with the request for a panel. 29

1. Consultation Rights & Duties
At first glance, it appears that the Member states have interpreted
the DSU rules to mean that consultations are mandatory, and that no
panel may be established without some form of negotiation. Closer
inspection of the paragraphs of Article 4, however, reveals that there is
no provision which specifically requires that a consultation must
precede the establishment of a panel. Certainly, Article 4(2), "Each
Member undertakes to accord sympathetic consideration to and afford
adequate opportunity for consultation regarding any representations .... "
and Article 4(4), citing that all requests for consultations shall be
notified to the DSB in writing, imply that such actions are mandatory.
More likely, Members realise the value of maintaining a link with the
procedures developed under Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT. 30
Even if adherence to the consultation requirement is the norm,
there have been a few cases under both the GATT and the WTO, where
Members have absolutely refused to enter into dialogue prior to the
establishment of a panel. Usually, these situations arise as a result of
political matters. For example, "the EC refused to consult with
Yugoslavia concerning EC trade sanctions in 1991."31 A more recent
example, under the WTO, occmred in 1997 "when the US requested
consultations with Ireland and the UK concerning customs
reclassification of high-technology products, [and] both responded by
referring to a letter from the EC stating that 'consultations will not be
entered into'. " 32
28

Ibid. mi. 4.7.
Ibid. art. 4.8.
3
°Kohona, supra note 21 at 35.
31
Davey & Porges, supra note 22 at 702.
32 Ibid. The issue involved was the division of competencies between the Community and
its member states in trade in goods.
29

CONSULTATIO NS UNDER THE WTO ... 287

Whether or not a Member has an 'absolute right to consult' was
decided in Brazil - Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut. 33 In that
dispute, the Philippines claimed that the countervailing duty imposed by
Brazil on the Philippines' exports of desiccated coconuts was
inconsistent with WTO and GATT rules. 34 The Philippines requested
consultations but Brazil refused, which prompted the panel to state that:
the Philippine's request concerns a matter which this Panel views with
the utmost seriousness. Compliance with the fundamental obligation
of WTO Members to enter into consultations where a request is made
under the DSU is vital to the operation of the dispute settlement
system. Article 4.2 of the DSU ... [and DSU Article 4.6] make clear
that Members' duty to consult is absolute and is not susceptible to the
prior imposition of any terms and conditions by a Member. 35

While it seems that Member states have a 'duty to consult', neither
the DSU nor the panels/Appellate Body regulate the substantive content
of those consultations. There is no indication as to how extensive the
talks should be or what standard, if any, the dialogue must meet. The
panel in EC - Regime far the Importation, Sale and Distribution ef
Bananas clarified this when the EC argued that the complainants did not
"fulfil the minimum consultation requirement of affording a reasonable
possibility for arriving at mutually satisfactory solution"36 The panel
rejected the EC's line of reasoning, citing that:
[c]onsultations are .. a matter reserved for the parties. The DSB is not
involved; no panel is involved; and the consultations are held in the
absence of the Secretariat. In these circumstances, we are not in a
position to evaluate the consultation process .. .it is our view that the
function of a panel is only to ascertain that consultations, if required,
were in fact held or at least requested. 37

33
34

Brazil - Measures A.ffectillg Desiccated CocO!lll/, WT/DS22/R, 287 (Oct. 17, 1996).
Owrview o.f the State-o.f-play of WTO Disputes, online: World Trade Organisation

<http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/dispute.htm> (last modified: 26 February 1999).
35 Brazil
Measures Affeclillg lJesicca!ed Coconut, WT/DS22/R, 287 (Oct. 17, 1996) as
quoted in Davey & Porges, supra note 22 at 702.
36

European Co111m1111ilies -Regime.for !he lmpor/alion, Sale a11d 1Jis!rib11tio11 ofBa11anas,

Report of the Panel, WT/DS27/US (May 22, 1997) as quoted in Terence P. Stewart & Mara M.
Burr, "The WTO's First Two and a Half Years of Dispute Resolution" (Summer, 1998) 23
N01ih Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Reg. 481 at 608.
37

E11ropea11 Commullilies - Regime/or the lmp011atio11, Sale a11d 1Jislributio11 ()/'Ba11a11as,

WT/DS27/R/USA, (May 22, 1997) as quoted in Davey & Porges, supra note 22 at 704.
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This writer agrees completely with the Bananas panel in that
consultations should be a dialogue sans interference from any outside
parties and unfettered by institutional requirements. 38 The entire DSU
settlement process has become quite regulated, in comparison with its
GATT predecessor. The purpose of consultations is for the Members to
work out their differences without rules or restrictions. It is an
opportunity to reach a solution in a manner suitable for that particular
issue and with regards to those particular parties. DSB interference at the
consultation stage would only mar the informal, diplomatic process that
is so critical in reaching a successful negotiated settlement.
Despite the improvements engineered into Article 4, WTO
consultations still suffer from certain drawbacks. For instance, what can
be done if a respondent wishes to conduct unhelpful negotiations? As
nothing regarding Member etiquette is contained within the paragraphs
of Article 4, there is little to prevent a Member from stonewalling during
negotiations. 39 The Appellate Body has provided some direction in this
matter when it declared that paiiies are expected to act in good faith:
All parties engaged in dispute settlement under the SDU must be fully
fo1thcoming from the very beginning both as to the claims involved in
a dispute and as to the facts relating to those claims. Claims must be
stated clearly. Facts must be disclosed freely. This must be so in
consultations as well as in the more formal setting of panel
proceedings. In fact, the demands of due process that are implicit in
the DSU make this especially necessary during consultations 40

Unfortunately, as the Appellate Body lacks the capacity to 'make
law', the above decree remains non-binding upon the Member states.
Another weakness in the system rests with Article 4(11). This
provision, regarding third party Members joining consultations, has
38
Unless, of course, the Members agree to utilise the good offices of the WTO under
Article 5.
39
See Davey & Porges, supra note 22 at 706-7. In situations where a respondent is
unwilling to answer a question in consultation, the complainant may seek additional factfinding from the panel. Gary Horlick, in a question & answer period, stated that "the rule under
the DSU is that panels should look only to their terms of reference in deciding which issues to
address, and should not look to what the parties may or may not have discussed in
consultations." He added that "if a party wishes to stonewall, that's its right [but] it risks
having the complaining party ask for very broad terms of reference [from the panel]."
40
India- Palen! Pro!ec!ion/or Pharmaceutical and Agricultural Chemical Products, WT!
DS50/ AB/R, 94 (Dec. 19, 1997) at WTO website, as quoted in Davey & Porges, supra note 22
at 705.
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been incorporated nearly unchanged from Article XXII of the GATT.
Joint consultations may be useful but often complicate matters, as
subsequent Members raise additional issues. The result is that
settlements become harder to achieve. Paragraph 11 also allows the
respondent to decide whether the prospective joiner's claim of
substantial interest is well founded. This means that respondents may
'stack the talks' by allowing "Members whose interests are aligned
with"41 it to join, while blocking those Members whose inclusion may
prove detrimental to their cause. However, these issues are not that
common. More than ever, due to the binding nature of the subsequent
panel decisions, Members usually see the consultation phase as an
opportunity to further their policies, not as an impediment to those
interests.

Having clarified the scope and procedures for consultations under
the WTO, the next step is to determine what role consultations play in
the dispute settlement process. To begin with, the pre-panel
consultations give "notice to defendants [of a grievance and provide the
parties with] a chance to settle in the manner that maximizes party
control."42 Also, even if the parties had previously engaged in informal
consultations, a formal request to the DSB for consultations
demonstrates that a Member is serious about resolving the dispute.
Furthermore, consultations allow the parties to put "forward facts ... to
show that circumstances [in the defendant country] are not unlike
circumstances in the complaining country."43 Referring to the Canada Certain Measures Concerning Periodica!sA4 case, one international
trade lawyer noted that "often a real exchange of factual data can be
useful. .. the exporting member will know how imports are treated, but
may not know how domestic interests are treated." 45 However the
Ibid. at 697.
Ibid. at 703.
43
Ibid. at 707.
44
Cal!ada Cer!mi1 A:feasures Crmcemli1g Periodicals, WT/DS31 (July 30, 1997).
45
Gary Horlick, "The Consultation Phase of WTO Dispute Resolution: A Private
Practitioner's View" (Fall, 1998) 32 Int'] Lawyer 685 at 692.
41

42
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consultations do more than simply allow the Members to gather
information and gain an understanding of the larger picture. If the
defendant can produce viable legal arguments, their ability to prevent a
panel request improves considerably. 46
It should also be noted that consultations may continue even after a
panel has been requested. Nothing in the DSU limits the belligerent
parties from discussing matters after the 60 days have elapsed. This
means that a settlement may be reached at any time, even after a panel or
Appellate Body has reached a decision. In European Communities
Trade Description of Scallops, the parties requested the panel to
postpone the issuance of the Final Report numerous times. Finally, on
May 10, 1996, the parties requested the panel to suspend the panel
proceedings in accordance with Article 12(12) of the DSU as they were
discussing the terms of a mutually agreed solution. 47
Consultations are not merely helpful in reaching a settlement. In
cases where no agreement can be reached, the talks may help clarify:
unceriainties about the scope and the nature of the measures at issue,
eliminating fruitless or invalid claims. Consultations are an important
means of focusing the dispute and setting up the case to facilitate the
panel's work, similar to the role of pre-trial conferences between
parties to domestic litigation. 48

If you ask an international trade lawyer, he or she will likely inform
you that consultations are now used extensively for providing Members
with this 'discovery process'. The negotiations allow a party to deduce
the other's strategy and to detennine the strengths and weakness of the
opponent's case. To trade lawyers, it is predominantly an opportunity to
acquire relevant information and documents that will be used to further
their cause at the panel stage. 49 The above demonstrates that WTO
consultations may play a substantial role in the legal process of
litigation, in addition to providing a forum for the more political process
of dispute resolution.
ibid.
Europea!l Communities Trade Description (}/'Scallops, Report of the Panel, WT/DS7/
R (Aug. 5, 1996), at 1996 WL 738813, (W.T.O.).
48 Davey & Porges, stpra note 22 at 703.
49
A telephone interview with an international trade lawyer at the Canadian Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DF AIT), who desired to remain anonymous ( 11
March 1999).
46
47
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v. FACTORS INFLUENCING CONSULTATIONS
Why is it that some disputes are resolved quickly, in the initial
consulting stages while other disputes are seemingly irreconcilable,
thereby necessitating advancement to the panel stage? Cases vary
considerably, although there are characteristics common to certain
disputes which reduce the possibility of a reaching a mutual solution
under the consultation phase.
To begin with, sensitive political issues may cause a state to forge
ahead and seek redress with a panel. Even if a Member knows that the
outcome would not be in its favour, the government may have to show
that it is "taking every possible step" to protect its interests. 5° For
example, in Canada - Periodica/s, 51 one could reasonably infer that
Ottawa knew that its policies, especially the punitive 80% excise tax,
were in contravention of its WTO obligations. Regardless, Canada was
reluctant to give in to US demands as the protection of Canadian culture
and the Canadian periodical industry remain a top priority. 52 In fact, it
seems that Ottawa often ignores the advice of its trade lawyers, "in
favour of political considerations when Canada decides what cases to
take before international bodies."53 For example, on July 10, 1998,
having failed to produce a settlement in negotiations, Canada requested
a panel to inquire into Brazil's alleged export subsidy of its aircraft
industry. 54 "In response, Brazil.. .challenged a range of Canadian
programs," financed by Industry Canada. 55 Apparently, the subsequent
50
Horlick, st1pra note 45 at 691. He cites EU-lJeef'Honnones, US- Costa Rica Textiles, and
possibly llrazil-Desiccated Coconuts as cases where the losing party knew or should have
known at the outset that it had little or no chance of winning.
51
Callado -Periodicals, supra note 44.
52
G. Gherson, Political Editor of The Natiollal Post, "Magazine War: "US rejects Canadian
line" The National Post (5 April 1999), online: The National Post <http://
www.nationalpost.com/home.asp?f=990405/2446121 > (date accessed: 6 April 1999).
Gherson explains that only recently have Canadian officials considered seriously
compromising with the US: "to avert a nasty trade war with its largest trading pminer, the
Chretien government has agreed to discuss possible compromises measures that would meet
Canadian cultural policy objectives while satisfying the US".
53 I. Jack, "Bureaucrats, lawyers feel passed over in WTO deals" The National Post (30
March 1999) C8.
54 H. Scoffield, "Canada breaks off talks with Brazil" The Globe a!ld Mail (l 0 July 1998)
SI I.
55 Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ct:mada/llrazil WTO
Panels -Aircraft, Owrview. 1998, online: Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and
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WTO ruling, which impacted negatively upon Canadian industry, was
quite foreseeable and Ottawa was duly forewarned. Why then did
Canada proceed with its action? According to one senior trade law
official, "Ottawa often starts cases simply to placate a powerful
stakeholder." 56 Of course, Canadian trade officials are not alone in their
frustration. Every Member state will have political interests or an
agenda which prevents it from acting in the most reasonable manner at
all times.
Another difficulty with mutually agreed upon solutions is that
some lead to allegations of inadequate implementation. 57 When a
settlement is reached as a result of consultations, the Members detach
themselves from the formal DSU mechanism. If a Member subsequently
reneges on the agreement, the complainant must begin the entire dispute
resolution process anew; in most instances, no fewer than 90 days will
pass before the complainant may request a panel! This potential delay
could act as an incentive in seeking a binding panel report, as the DSB
under Article 21 will be sure to monitor the respondent's compliance. 58
Finally, there are disputes which simply cannot be resolved
through consultations, no matter how extensive the talks. In United
States
Restriction on /mports o.f Cotton and Man-Made Fibre
Costa Rica complained that US restrictions on textile
imports from Costa Rica were in violation of the Agreement on Textiles
and Clothing. Consultations were held under that provision which did
not result in a settlement. Again, when Costa Rica subsequently
requested additional consultations with the US under Article 4 of the
DSU, no mutual solution was reached and the matter had to go to a
panel. 59 An even better example of a seemingly unresolvable issue is the
EC - Banana.1'0 dispute. Over the years, a multitude of negotiations have
all failed to resolve the contentious issues. Even the intercession of the

International Trade <http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/air_overview-e.asp> (date
accessed: 20 March 1999).
56
Jack, supra note 53 at C8.
57 Horlick, sztpra note 45 at 688. For example see Fl!i/ippti1es
Fork WT/DS 102/l (Oct. 7
1997).
58
Ibid.
59 United States
Resrrictio11 011 Imports q/ Cot/011 a11d 1J.fan-1J,fade Fibre Underwear,
Report of the PaneL WT/DS24 (8 November 1996), at 1996 WL 738823 (W.T.O.).
60 EC - Ba11anas, s1tpra note 36.
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WTO Director-General in January 1999, failed to find a lasting
compromise, although it did forestall US actions for a while. 61
Conversely, there are a number of reasons why parties may deem it
in their best interest to avoid proceeding to the panel stage. The most
obvious factor is the bitter reality of having an independent arbitrator,
such as the WTO, direct a sovereign state's actions. This is especially
difficult in situations where the level of trade is considerable or if
political issues are involved. 62 However, it seems that this factor is not
very determinative. Generally, countries do not resent having to go to a
panel, and even respondents who lose a decision seem to stoically accept
the report. 63
Although it was discussed above that one boon to the panel system
was its surveillance and compliance aspect, as a general rule, it may be
better not to force implementation. As most decisions are appealed, the
entire process may take up to 15 months or longer to resolve, as was
evident in the ongoing EC- Bananas64 dispute. Sometimes, it is better to
take the risk of non-implementation that comes with a settlement, in
order to gain relatively quick access to the other country's markets. 65
Countries may even be influenced in their decision by the nature of
the adjudicators. At times, the neutrality of panelists and Appellate
Body members may be called into question. Although "Panelists ... are
forbidden from sitting on Panels where their governments are a party to
the proceeding, Appellate Body members are under no such
prohibition." 66 Also, even though a panellist's state cannot be a party to
61
See "EC, US Accept Ruggiero Compromise on Banana Dispute", online: World Trade
Organisation <http://www.wto.org/wto/new/dsweb.htm> (date accessed: 10 March 1999).
62
Stewart & Burr, supra note 36 at 514-516. These authors note two high profile US cases
where agreements were reached that either ended the dispute or postponed action by the panel.
First, at 515, they discuss the US- automobile dispute with Japan where a bilateral agreement
was reached before the retaliatory tariffs were implemented. Then, at 516, they describe the
politically sensitive EC case over the implementation of the Cuban Libo1y a!ld Democratic
So!idari(JJ Ac!.
63 A telephone interview with a DFAIT trade lawyer, supra note 49, who indicated that no
one resents having to go to a panel, and that Canada has not had a problem with even negative
WTO decisions.
64
EC -1Ja11a11as, supra note 36. In this case, the panel was established on 8 May 1996. The
report of the Appellate Body was not adopted until 25 September 1997. In addition, there was
further contention regarding the reasonable implementation time period that continued into
1999.
65
Ibid.
66 Stewart & Burr, supra note 36 at 491.
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the dispute, that state may still have an interest in the outcome of the
proceeding.
Any analysis attempting to explore the reason why some cases are
settled while others go forward must include some discussion of the
nature of the participants. Parties to the WTO/GATT are states with a
variety of idiosyncratic abilities, resources and interests which
determine how each state will react to a specific situation. Some
countries are naturally more conciliatory and generally prefer to resolve
a dispute by diplomatic means rather than through a (semi) legal process
such as a panel. Other parties are reluctant to compromise, which tends
to inhibit successful settlements. Robert Hudec has compiled extensive
research on certain GATT Parties regarding their tendencies towards
dispute resolution., and while the data pertains to GATT disputes, his
observations are still relevant to a contemporaneous WTO study.
To begin with, it appears that "Japan had by far the highest
percentage of cases settled or conceded (65 percent), more than double
that of any other participant. " 67 Although Japan is "an economic
giant, ... its traditional isolation and its relatively closed society and
economy [have led Japan] to avoid confrontational extremes in litigation
and to settle complaints against it wherever possible."68 Canada, on the
other hand, had
the lowest settlement rate and far and away the highest percentage of
cases that went to a legal ruling, 73 percent for the full 42 year period,
and 64 percent for the 1980s alone. In sum, Canada presents the profile
of a smaller country that prefers to wage open combat over legal
complaints against it. Being relatively small, most of the time it is
forced to resist all the way to a legal ruling. 69

Similarly, the United States "seems to prefer resistance to
settlement, but its power makes its resistance considerably more
effective. " 70 Other noteworthy points include the fact that developing
countries agreed to settle 41 percent of complaints against them whereas
developed country defendants settled only 27 percent. 71
67

Hudec, supra note 11 at 301.
ibid.
69
ibid. at 301-302.
70
ibid. at 302-3. Hudec explains that instead of litigation nearly half of the complaints
against the US were withdrawn or abandoned: 44% overall and 53% in the more rough-andtumble 1980s.
71
ibid. at 303.
68
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This data suggests that in GATT, where many disputes were settled
diplomatically, and where no binding panel scheme existed, the
economic power of a Contracting Party was an important, if not critical,
factor in determining the outcome of a dispute. Indeed, Hudec' s analysis
shows that developing countries have tended to grant more favourable
settlements: "developing ... countries have granted full satisfaction of
the claim in 82 percent [while] Japan and the EC ... have granted full
satisfaction in only 46 percent and 54 percent of their settlements,
respectively." 72 He concludes that the GATT dispute settlement system
was "more responsive to the interest of the strong than to the interests of
the weak." 73 The question remains whether the new DSU rules have
altered this state of affairs.

VI.

CONSULTATIONS UNDER A BINDING
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM

This last section examines whether consultations under the DSU
have been more effective in settling disputes than consultations under
the GATT dispute resolution process. Due to the relatively recent
implementation of the DSU, this is a difficult question to answer. One
may argue, however, that the WTO Members continue to display
confidence in the new dispute system, including the consultation phase.
States are bringing their disputes under the DSU in increasing numbers.
As of February 26, 1999, there have been 163 consultation requests
under the DSU, involving 125 Distinct Matters (cases). Out of these
figures, 19 ( 15 percent of the cases) Appellate and panel Reports have
been adopted, while 30 cases (24%) have been settled or are inactive. 74
This figure demonstrates that, notwithstanding the new legalistic
provisions of the DSU, the WTO Members continue to rely heavily
upon diplomatic consultations in order to settle their disputes.
In comparison, GATT experienced 207 requests from 1948 to 1989
for consultations under Aii XXIII. Of this total, 64 (31 %) were settled

72
73
74

/bid. at 307.
/bid at 353.
See OverJJiew, supra note 34.
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prior to formal ruling. 75 This 7 percent difference between the GATT
and WTO, while slight, may seem to suggest that more countries are
willing to bring their disputes to the WTO but are less willing to settle. 76
One explanation for the discrepancy is that with a binding dispute
mechanism, a more judicial panel, and a standing Appellate Body,
complainants are bringing forward cases which were once thought to be
too complex or sensitive; they would have been blocked under the
GATT rules. 77 Such complex cases are not amenable to resolution
through negotiation. "Indeed, countries such as Venezuela, which had
previously filed cases under the GATT have now refiled under the WTO
because of the various benefits offered" in the new system. 78
Does this mean that consultations under the WTO will be relegated
to an insignificant procedural waystop on the 'road to the panels'?
Certainly there are those who will argue that the DSU consultation phase
is nothing more than a fact-finding, legal 'discovery' process. One
DFAIT trade lawyer described it as a "fishing expedition" where the
legal officials "clamp down on incautious commentary and attempt to
get as much out of the other side as they can."79 This kind of approach is
disturbing in that it may seriously undermine the importance of
negotiations to WTO dispute resolution. Fortunately, enough
government officials (and even some international trade lawyers) realise
that one may still accrue otherwise unattainable political and economic
gains from successful consultations.

75 Hudec, supra note 11 at 277. 88 (43%) cases were subject of formal rulings, 64 (31 %)
settled prior to formal ruling, and 55 (27%) were withdrawn of abandoned.
76 In a telephone interview, this writer was warned by a DF AIT trade negotiator, who
desired to remain anonymous, to be careful in using statistical analysis in formulating a
general opinion. The negotiator indicated that the cases are very diverse and that they are
affected by numerous factors that may lead to inaccurate observations (17 March 1999).
77 Hudec, supra note 11 at 14 and 290. As noted above, in the late 1980s, more and more
difficult legal issues were being brought before the GATT. These highly sensitive issues
resulted in an increasing number of failures as governments used their veto power to block the
creation of panels.
78 G. D. Aldonas, "The World Trade Organisation: Revolution in International Trade
Dispute Settlements" (1995) 50 Dispute Resolution J. 73 at 79. Because of the GATT
consensus requirements, "panels often found themselves writing their rep01is to ensure [that]
they could gain a consensus among the GATT membership"; without the blocking capability,
panels may now pass more neutral decisions.
79
A telephone interview with a DF AIT trade lawyer, supra note 49 ( 11 March 1999).
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With regard to the comparisons with the GATT statistics, it should
be noted that the 31 % GATT settlement rate applied to the entire history
of the Contract. The statistics include earlier periods, in the 1950s,
where conciliation among the relative small number of Contracting
Parties meant that settlements were more common. In the 1980s, the
percentage of cases settled or conceded in GATT declined to 24% (28
out of 155 complaints) as disputes became more complicated and
politically sensitive. 80 The figure matches exactly the WTO percentage
of settled disputes; this is surprising for an organisation which is often
considered more adjudicative than its GATT predecessor.
It is true that many WTO members argued strongly in favour of a
legalistic dispute mechanism within the DSU. This does not mean,
however, that these countries are unwilling to seriously consider
diplomatic channels to address their problems. Evidence of the
Members' reliance upon negotiation to sort out their difficulties can be
found within the policy of perhaps the WTO's most active member (and
complainant). The United States Government, one of the strongest
proponents of a legalistic scheme, has summarised its position on the
WTO consultations. "The new dispute settlement rules often make it
possible for us to enforce WTO agreements without ever having to reach
a panel decision." 81 The United States Trade Representative has also
stated that "the principal strength of an international organization like
the WTO is the opportunity to focus and place emphasis on resolving
differences before they rise to the level of formal disputes." 82 The
European view is akin to that of the United States. Sir Leon Brittan
summarised the European Union's view by commenting that "the
binding nature of the DSU encourages the settlement of dispute through
consultations. " 83
It is evident that Members are as enthusiastic about resolving their
differences in negotiations today, as they were under GATT. Under the
Hudec, supra note 11 at 291.
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Report 011 Trade Expansion Priorities
Pursuant to ExecutiFe Order J2901 (Super 301), 62 Fed. Reg. 52,604-611 ( 1997) as found in
Horlick, supra note 45 at 685.
82
Office of the United States Trade Representative, Rep011 011 WTO lmp!ementatio11jonn
the Presidents AdJJis01y Committee far Trade Policy and Negotiations: WTO Jmp!eme!l/atio11
Report, I I March I996, online: United States Trade Representative <http://www.ustr.gov/
repo1is/wto/dispute.html> (date accessed: 26 March 1999).
83
Sir Leon Brittan as quoted in Horlick, supra note 45 at 686.
so
81
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DSU, Mr. Hudec's trend seems to remain fairly consistent, although it is
still too early to comment with certainty. Generally, the majority of
settlements still occur when the Members are of similar economic
strength84 or where the complainant is more powerful economically than
the respondent. 85 Individually, Japan has been involved in three
settlements in which it was the respondent. 86 Yet, Japan has become less
conciliatory recently, and is taking a harder line in WTO consultations,
and negotiations in general. According to one trade negotiator, "Japan
has become more pragmatic" and has reassessed its strategy. 87 Canada,
true to its combative nature, has not settled any of the cases instigated
against it, although as a complainant, it has settled in a few cases. The
US has continued to resolve a large number of cases in consultation, as a
complainant. Surprisingly, the US has also settled a significant number
of disputes as a respondent! 88 The Members, it seems, have not
completely forgotten that mutually agreed upon solutions are more
productive in the long run and that trade disputes can be settled on a winwin basis.
Perhaps the greatest rationale for seeking a negotiated solution
under the DSU involves the relationship between the consultation and
panel stages. An argument can be made that the binding nature of the
panel process acts as a deterrent to proceeding past the consultation
stage and therefore, works to induce settlement by negotiation.
Although a panel merely ensures that the Members comply with their
GATT obligations, the automatic adoption of a potentially harsh report
which must be complied with in a set period of time 89 is a powerful
84

See OvenJie11' supra note 34: for example, Yellezue!a - Anti-Dumping, complaint by
Mexico (DS23), Malaysia -Polyethyle!le, complaint by Singapore (DSI).
85
Ibid. For example, Korea Laws, Regulations and Practices 1i1 the Telecomm1111icatio11s
Sector, complaint by the European Communities (DS40), Pakistan
Pharmaceutical
Products, complaint by the US (DS36).
86 Ibid. See Japall, te!ecom (DS 15) Japan, sou11d recordi11gs (DS28, DS42) Japan,
procurement (DS73)
overview.
87 A telephone interview with a DF AIT trade negotiator, supra note 76 (17 March 1999).
88 US, wool coats (DS32) , US, anti-dumping duties (CTVs) (DS89), US, automobiles
(DS6), US,Cuba (Helms Burton) Act (DS38) US, hormones retaliation (DS39), US-Measures
Affecting Textiles and Apparel Products, complaint by the European Communities (DS85).,
US-Anti-Dumping Investigation Regarding Imports of Fresh or Chilled Tomatoes from
Mexico, complaint by Mexico (DS49)
89
DSU, supra note I, art. 21.
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incentive to resolve a dispute in a more conciliatory manner. For
example, a complainant may negotiate with a respondent in an informal
non-WTO setting, to no effect. 90 The complainant may then find that
same respondent more amenable to a compromise after the complainant
initiates the dispute settlement procedure under the DSU. The threat of a
binding panel report, which the respondent will not be able to block
unilaterally, will certainly cause a respondent to reconsider the
situation. 91 Therefore, commencing the consultation phase of the DSU
shows that the complainant is serious, and determined to end the
dilemma. It also means that negative repercussions for the respondent
may follow, should a resolution not be reached. 92
A good example of this deterrent effect is the United States Automobiles dispute. 93 The case is also noteworthy as an example of a
complainant in a favourable position seeking to settle. In response to the
US declaration that it would impose 100 percent tariffs on Japanese
luxury cars on June 28, 1995, Japan requested consultations under
Article 4 of the DSU, so that talks could begin no later than June 17. If
Japan had initiated actions under Art. XXIII of the GATT, the lack of a
strict timeline would have meant that the sanctions would have been in
place by the time the GATT settlement mechanisms would begin. 94
Although it was accepted that Japan had a strong case, 95 the Japanese
90

A telephone interview with a DFAIT trade negotiator, supra note 76, who indicated that
settlements that are capable of being resolved are often settled pnor to the formal consultation
phase; thus, those disputes that proceed to the WTO consultation phase are usually quite
difficult to resolve (17 March 1999).
91
A telephone interview with a second DF AIT trade lawyer, who wished to remain
anonymous. The lawyer conceded that although not much has changed in consultations (under
the DSU), there 'may' be more pressure to settle, as no Member can block the reports (23
March 1999).
92
Ibid. As defendants predominantly lose in panel disputes, it is in their best interest to
settle. In settlements, one, at least, has the opportunity to acquire or retain some benefits.
93
United Stales
l111posil1"o11 of Import Duties 011 A11!0111obiles ji"Olll Japan 1111der
Sec/1011s JOI and 104 oflhe Trade Ac! of1974, WT/DS6, settled on 19 July 1995.
94
W.E. Scanlan, "A Test Case for the New World Trade Organisation's Dispute Settlement
Understanding: The Japan-United States Auto Parts Dispute" (1997) 45 Univ. of Kansas Law
Rev. 591 at 607-8.
95 See World Trade Organisation (WTO) Dispute Settlement Review Commission Act:
Hearings on S. 16 Before the Senate Comm. On Fin., 1041h Cong. 21 (1995) (statement of Alan
F. Holmer, former Deputy U.S. Trade Representative) (commenting that "Japan has a darn
good case in the WTO that [the United States has] violated [the trade] agreement") as found in
ibid. at 609.
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chose to pursue a negotiated settlement with the Americans, which was
reached the day before the tariffs were to go into effect. Pursuing its case
with a DSB panel beyond the tariff deadline would have resulted in a
$5.9 billion loss to Japan's automobile manufacturers. 96 This, and the
possibility of a trade war with the US, prompted a complainant in a
supe1ior position to concede to a settlement. Meanwhile, an argument
may be made that the US chose to pursue its grievances outside of the
WTO, in the form of the unilateral tariffs, as it did not feel that it had a
strong case. 97 Similarly, the US may have been apprehensive of a neutral
panel rnling against its sanctions. Washington would naturally prefer to
dictate its own trade policies, and the government probably felt that its
interests would be best served in a settlement with a traditionally
conciliatory country.

CONCLUSION

Many predictions were made in the mid-1990s that the WTO
would become an adjudicative body where 'lawyers would tiiumph over
diplomats' .98 Indeed, the panels and the Appellate Body are presiding
over an increasing number of disputes, and the consultations are being
used extensively as legalistic fact finding missions. However, this is not
to say that Members have forsaken the use of consultations to remedy
their dilemmas. Even those complainants whose goal is to obtain a
favourable panel decision, will attempt to supplement their legal
proceedings with a negotiation strategy. In other words, consultations
will continue to remain an active and vital element within the WTO
dispute settlement system.
Statistically the number of disputes settled under the DSU and the
GATT are relatively equal, notwithstanding that the cases are more
Scanlan, supra note 94 at 609.
See M. Felsenthal, "U.S. Threatens Duties on Luxury Cars Worth $5.9 Billion in Japan
301 Dispute" 12 Int'! Trade Rep. (BNA) 848, at 849 (quoting Japanese Automobile
Manufacturer's Association Director, William Duncan, who commented that "the [U.S.]
administration has said that it will ask the WTO to review Japan's auto markets, but can't wait
for a verdict before imposing a sentence ... This can only mean that they have little faith in their
position.") as found in Scanlan, supra note 94 at 610.
98
See Young, supra note 10.
96
97
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complex and politically sensitive than ever before. Part of the reason for
the continued use of negotiated settlements is that certain governments
and situations are simply more amenable to compromise. In other cases,
the paiiies' interests are such that a quick resolution is sought; under
these circumstances, waiting on months of appeals is not a viable option.
Finally, the binding nature of the DSU discourages parties with a weak
case from proceeding past the negotiation phase. Through dialogue, a
state can usually retain some benefits which would otherwise have been
lost to a panel report which can no longer be blocked. In the end, it is
ironic that one of the rules which fashioned the WTO into such a
legalistic entity ensures that this organization will remain a forum of
consultation.

